Despite the use of automation technology in the maritime industry, human errors are still the typical navigational risk factors in Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships with the third degree of autonomy, as defined by the International Maritime Organization. To analyse these human errors, a prediction model for human errors in the emergency disposal process is present. First, the risk factors are identified by analysing the emergency disposal behaviour process of a Shore Control Centre (SCC) under remote navigation mode. This is followed by the establishment of an event tree model of human errors using Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP). Furthers, a Bayesian Networks (BNs) model based on the THERP is proposed for the three stages: perception, decision, and execution. Subsequently, expert judgments based on the fuzzy theory are used to obtain the basic probability of root nodes and determine the conditional probability of each node in the BNs. Finally, the probabilities of human errors are calculated for the three stages, while the importance of human error factors is quantified with sensitivity analysis, which can provide flexible references for theoretical construction of the SCC and training of staff.
INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of smart ship technology, autonomous ships will inevitably become the main emphasis of innovations by the shipping industry in the near future. For instance, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) at the 98th MSC put the concept of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ship (MASS) forward in 2017. Subsequently, the relevant departments started working on defining applicable laws and regulations from 2018 onwards. Meanwhile, many researchers have come up with preliminary definitions of MASS and established several stages for the development of MASS [1] . Specifically, there can be four development stages based on the perspective of autonomy [2] :
• An automated program can operate ships and provide decision support.
• Ships can be controlled remotely with crew on board.
• Ships can be controlled remotely without any crew on board.
• Ships can be controlled completely autonomously. The improvement in automation technology will lead to a reduction in the number of people on board, which can promote the realization of autonomous ship navigation [3] . Depending on the extent of development in academic communities that the elaboration of MASS with the third degree of autonomy has already settled down. Examples of projects focusing on MASS with the third degree of autonomy include the Maritime Unmanned Ships through Intelligence in Networks (MUNIN, 2015) and Advanced Autonomous Waterborne Applications (AAWA, 2016) projects. Specifically speaking, the navigation mode of MASS with the third degree of autonomy can be divided into four subclasses: 1) ships departing from the harbor manually; 2) fully autonomous navigation mode; 3) remotely manipulated driving by officers of Shore Control Centers (SCCs) and 4) fail-to-safe mode [4] . This paper proposes a prediction model of human failure probability with the focus on autonomous MASS with the third degree of autonomy. Maritime risk analysis considers as the research hotspot for both traditional and autonomous ships. On one hand, human errors are the main causes of ship accidents in traditional ships [5, 6] , some researchers have argued that the marine safety level could be significantly improved if no crew on board to operate the ship, similar to the MASS with the third degree of autonomy. On the other hand, if there is no crew operated the ship in real-time, new hazard scenarios can emerge as the crew's presence, mobility and flexibility in maintenance and emergency occasions is of the essence. For example, serious accidents are highly likely to occur if there is no crew on board in the presence of equipment failure, such as "shift of cargo" or breakdown of the main engine. Conversely, these problems can be avoided if the crew detects these issues and resolves them on time [7] . Under these circumstances, it is necessary to analyse the role of human errors in the MASS with the third degree of autonomy as the autonomous cargo ships still involve safety risks attached to their operations.
Several studies have conducted human error analysis of maritime accidents. For instance, Ramos et al. [8] discussed the performance of factors influencing human behaviour in autonomous ships. Based on the human cognitive reliability analysis method, these study first subdivided human factors in autonomous ships into direct/indirect and internal/external factors, and subsequently established a decision-making model of factors influencing human behaviour. The authors discussed the main factors that influence the operators' decisions and actions while working on shore were pointed out, four factors: information overload, situation awareness, skill degradation, and boredom in particular. Trudi et al. [9] dubbed the autonomous ship as an "uninhabited" vehicle and argued that it could not be operated without human operators. From a theoretical perspective, autonomous ships can increase the safety of ships. Nevertheless, in reality, there are many uncertainties about safety of the autonomous ships due to lack of first-hand multi-sensory experience. After that, human errors will be transferred to a SCC. Thus, to overcome new challenges that autonomous cargo ships face regarding both safe operation and monitoring, several safety features were put forward, which included communication costs, cyber security, information overload, data sharing, human-machine interaction, situational awareness, psychological load, over-reliance on automatic systems, social factors relating to autonomous cargo ships, and requirements for learning new skills. In addition, Porathe et al. [10] analysed the current situation of SCC for unmanned ships under remote driving mode, and discussed the risks emanating from both ship conditions and human factors that will be faced by the SCC in the near future. The authors observed that maintaining situational awareness in the SCC is much more challenging than creating it. Rather than solely relying on simulated ship bridges, extensive training was needed to maintain situational awareness for real ships. Wróbel et al. [11] assessed the potential impact of unmanned vessels on maritime transportation safety. The human factor issues were focused on remote monitoring and controlling of autonomous unmanned vessels [12, 13] . Previous studies mostly focused on human factors from a macro perspective and lacked human error modelling that can occur in the emergency disposal process under remote control of the SCC. In this regard, consolidation is urgently needed of relevant theoretical models to analyse human error factors in autonomous cargo ships [14] .
Bayesian Network modelling is an artificial intelligence tool used to model uncertainty in a domain or system with the ability to conduct statistical inference [15, 16] , the ability to incorporate new observations into the network, the ability to describe inherent causal and associated probabilistic for the systems and the ability to analyse the complex dependences among the systematic indicators [17] . In the context of human error probability estimation that combines Bayesian approach with an existing method. Some research estimate the human error probability in oil tanker collision [18] , winter navigation [19] , grounding and collision [20] . This paper aims to fill the above mentioned research gaps and combine the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) and Bayesian Network (BNs) to model the emergency response process followed by operators present on the SCC. Specifically, the THERP prediction method is used to analyse the emergency response process and establish the event tree model. Each event node is modelled with the BNs model, which considers uncertainties and predicts the human error probability.
ANALYSIS OF HUMAN EMERGENCY OPERATING BEHAVIOR IN THE SCC
Under the autonomous navigation mode, autonomous cargo ships can be faced with unfavourable situations caused by factors such as external environment, organizational elements, and ship equipment. As these situations cannot be handled on board the ship, danger warnings will be sent to the SCC to seek for assistance from the remote control. In this situation, many researchers have established several decision-making models and control flowcharts corresponding to personnel emergency response process [21, 22] . In our context, the personnel emergency response process of the SCC can be viewed as the process based on the operators' cognitive behaviour, namely, risk information perception → judgment decision → execution [23] . During this process, numerous types of human errors can lead to severe accidents due to influence of the simulation device, equipment, surrounding environment, operating equipment, and personnel quality. This section analyses and establishes the operator's cognitive emergency response process, as shown in Fig. 1 Figure 1 . Human error analysis framework on the SCC
HUMAN FAILURE PROBABILITY PREDICTION MODEL

Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction
The THERP can be applied for analysing daily operations following normal regulars, which is widely used in the quantitative analysis of human reliability, complex systems analysis of routine testing and analysis of maintenance tasks.
The THERP involves several aspects such as event tree analysis (ETA) [24, 25] , factor analysis of personnel performance, and combining quantitative calculation based on human error database. For instance, based on the event tree model, the THERP creates two attitude branch trees for the time sequence of participating events to calculate the error probabilities of all human behaviours. For this purpose, the THERP needs to consider all kinds of human behaviours in the process of event development, and make accurate quantification based on the specific error characteristics of different operations. This requires the human errors analysis to conduct detailed investigations and interviews on each specific human factor event, to fully understand and identify the key behaviours and related operational details. Thereafter, quantitative analysis can be finally carried out.
Meanwhile, the engineering application is faced with several problems associated with a complicated analysis processes, for example, huge manpower and material inputs, insufficient standardization, and excessive reliance on expert judgment. To overcome these problems, this paper divides the human error process into three stages based on human error rate prediction analysis method, and then constructs the BN model for each stage. These steps mitigate the problem of large amount of data required in the model, and settle down the relationship between human factors greatly [26] .
Bayesian network
The Bayesian formula given in (1) serves as the theoretical basis of the BN. It is principally used to describe the conditional probability inference between two variables.
(1)
The formula is made up of prior probability, conditional probability and posterior probability of the events. The prior probability means the occurrence probability of an event based on historical data or subjective expert judgment, conditional probability refers to the occurrence probability of random event B when event A has occurred, under the hypothesis that B is a non-zero probability event. The posterior probability refers to the updated probability of an event occurring after taking into consideration prior and conditional probabilities.
(2)
The BN is mostly used to model system uncertainties, which are mainly embodied in a Bayesian inference problem. The Bayesian inference problem is a conditional probability reasoning problem, which can be subdivided into two different reasoning models: forwarding reasoning and backward reasoning. Forward reasoning can be viewed as one type of predictive reasoning. To be specific, it transmits the new explanatory variable information forward to the response variable along the direction of the BN arc, thereby updating the probability of the response variable. On the other hand, backward reasoning, also known as diagnostic reasoning, first determines the expected value of the response variable. Then, it places this value in the BN and reverse transmits the information to establish the value of the explanatory variable.
When a BN contains n nodes, it is usually represented as Δ={G(V, E), P}, where G(V, E) represents an acyclic directed graph G containing n nodes. The node variables in the BN graph are represented by the elements in the set V = {V 1 ,...,V n }, the Bayesian arc E stands for the causal relationship between the variables, and P shows the Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) of nodes in the BN model.
Suppose that an event θ = {θ 1 ,...,θ n } has n reference values. When the observed values X={X 1 ，...，X n } are available, we can calculate the posterior probability distribution table of θ using (3) as follows, based on the BN:
(3) Figure 2 is an example route from event A to event B in a BNs. Node A impacts node B directly in the network, which means that the former node, being the parent of node B, will affect the occurrence probability of event B. The arrow in Fig. 2 means node A in the directed acyclic graph points to the directed arc of node B, which embodies a sub-node relationship between the two events, while conditional probability P(A|B) represents the dependency between events A and B. Noticeably, while the BNs model is constructed, each node can establish a sub-node relationship with the other nodes, but there should be no circular directed model. That is, closed loop is prohibited for the model. 
Modeling and Analysis of THERP+BNs
ET model for dealing with emergency
By analysing Fig. 1 and based on the time sequence of events, we can divide the human error events in the SCC into three stages: perception, decision and execution. Accordingly, an event tree model can be established as shown in Fig. 3 . According to the emergency process to be followed by the personnel during accidents, the human error probability in the event tree consists of the following three parts: 1) Untimely perception probability P1, which means that the danger warning is not perceived within the controllable time, and consequently, the control of autonomous cargo ship is not taken over by the SCC in a timely manner.
2) Incorrect decision probability P2, which refers to the failure of taking effective measures in an emergency to stop the accident.
3) Operation failure probability P3, which means that a correct decision taken by the personnel still leads to an accident. Therefore, the total human error probability p can be obtained as follows:
(4)
Three-stage human factors classification
The variables of the BNs model are mainly reflected in the form of various nodes in the network. Additionally, the directed edges represent the mutual relationship between these variables, while the conditional probability of the node refers to the strength or degree of dependence of relationships among the nodes. This study strives to establish a Bayesian model of human error for the SCC based on the following steps:
(1) Determination of BNs nodes In this paper, the human error model of the entire SCC is subdivided into three parts, which include untimely perception, incorrect decision and operation failure. These parts have been used as the output nodes of the three BNs models, respectively. We have identified 16 common human factors that can cause ship accidents, based on literature review and expert investigation of human factors in autonomous ships. In this regard, these 16 factors work as sub-nodes of the BNs and classify them in accordance with the three stages of perception, decision, and execution. To better illustrate the developmental sequence involved in the accident chain of autonomous cargo ships, the classification of these human factors are presented in Table 1 . In addition to the 16 nodes based on these human factors, it is necessary to use three additional nodes, namely "untimely perception", "incorrect decision" and "operation failure". These additional nodes indicate that the occurrence of a series of factors at each stage leads to the occurrence of relevant nodes at the same stage. Therefore, there are a total of 19 Bayesian nodes, which are described in Table 2 . These nodes include the human error factors in the entire SCC, which means the "human" is not limited to only one operator but includes all the staff present in the SCC, i.e., monitoring personnel, helmsmen, cockpit operators, and so on.
The label A1 refers to the negligence that occurs when one person is monitoring multiple ships. During the navigation of autonomous cargo ships, the responsibilities of the SCC staff are mainly concerned with monitoring the state of motion of the ships in real-time, which means monitoring multiple ships simultaneously during one session [27] . During the monitoring process, navigation information should be received continuously from each ship. Accordingly, when the volume of information handled by a staff member reaches a saturation value, known as "information overload" and labeled as A4, there is a possibility of negligence. In this context, "information overload" (A4) is the parent node of "negligence when one person monitors multiple ships" (A1).
Insufficient vigilance, labelled as A2, refers to the inability to perceive danger warning due to reduced vigilance by the staff present in the SCC towards monitoring of autonomous cargo ships. The "excessive fatigue", labelled as A3, "insufficient sense of responsibility", labelled as A5, and "poor physical and mental conditions", labelled as A6, are all caused by "insufficient vigilance" (A2). In addition, the convenience arising due to automation also makes SCC personnel "over-dependent on automation", labelled as A7, thereby reducing personnel vigilance. Furthermore, when "insufficient vigilance" (A2) occurs among personnel, the above human factors are already included in the node, thus no separate statistics and illustrations will be given for the four nodes corresponding to A3, A5, A6 and A7.
As for the inappropriate emergency decision-making, labelled as B1, when the monitoring personnel receive the danger warning from an autonomous cargo ship, the decision-makers often have "insufficient understanding of information", labelled as B3, during the process of emergency decision-making. The reason is due to different locations of the autonomous cargo ship and the personnel, or failure of the personnel to take into account the weather and sea conditions at the time of autonomous cargo ship navigation, which can lead to wrong decisions.
When it comes to "lack of experience in emergency disposal", labelled as B2, the crew at the SCC need to acquire new skills for remotely managing the emergencies. This training can provide practical experience and help in avoiding incorrect decisions in response to remote emergencies.
The psychological difference is labelled as C1. An example of this difference is the inability of the operators in the SCC to acquire the real "ship perception", labelled as C3, since these operators operate on simulators. Thereby, real immersion in a scene cannot take place because of the simulated scenes, leading to "situational awareness defect", labelled as C2 [28] . This situation results in a psychological gap for the operator who finds it unable to immerse himself in the scene, known as "uncoordinated man-machine interaction" (C4), which leads to operational failure.
In terms of "insufficient training" (C5), a group of new crews should not only master navigation technology, but also software equipment and algorithm-related knowledge. In other words, the requirements for crew quality are becoming stricter. Substandard operation technology is a major cause of shipwrecks. Therefore, the problem of insufficient training will be one of the most important reasons for operation failures in future navigation of autonomous cargo ships. To avoid these failures, the personnel should be required to undergo a gradually increasing amount of training.
Model structure
It can be observed that "insufficient vigilance" (A2) in the perception stage serves as the sub-node of four nodes, i.e., "excessive fatigue" (A3), "insufficient sense of responsibility" (A5), "poor physical and mental conditions" (A6), and "automation-induced complacency" (A7). Furthermore, it serves as the parent node of "negligence when one person monitors multiple ships" (A1) and "untimely perception" (A), while "automation-induced complacency" is also the parent node of "negligence when one person monitors multiple ships" (A1).
In the decision stage, "inappropriate decision" (B1) serves as the sub-node of "insufficient understanding of information" (B3) and "no consideration to weather, sea conditions, etc." (B4), while both B1 and "lack of experience in emergency disposal" (B2) are the parent nodes of "decision failure" (B).
In the operation stage, "psychological difference" (C1) serves as the sub-node of "situational awareness defect" (C2) and "lack of ship perception" (C3). Both C1 and C2 are the parent nodes of "uncoordinated man-machine interaction" (C4). Meanwhile, C4 and "insufficient training" (C5) are the parent nodes of "operation failure" (C). Based on these relationships between children and parent nodes, the three-stage BNs model can be constructed, as shown in Figs. 4-6. 
CASE STUDY
Data description
As the availability of data related to human factors in the SCCs is limited, expert experience method is adopted for analysis of basic occurrence probability of these factors. On the other hand, the human factors in this study provide theoretical support, risk prevention and control measures for future construction of the SCCs and personnel training. In this section, the expert data are processed by fuzzy triangular numbers. For instance, three well-known experts in the field of water safety evaluation and having experience for more than 15 years, were invited to provide evaluation comments on basic event probability of human error in autonomous cargo ship navigation. Considering the rich working experience of the experts, their comments were deemed as important as other methods described in the following steps:
• Frequency grading
In the process of risk assessment, it is sufficient to only use frequency for event grading [29] , such as the grading method provided in Table 3 . This frequency can be either a risk assessment indicator or a safety performance indicator. It can be observed based on the standard and definition of the frequency level that the frequency in a level is usually 10 times higher than that in the previous level. According to this definition, the corresponding level number can also be approximated on a logarithmic scale. 
It can be seen from (5) that the triangular number can be represented by three parameters, i.e., a, m and b. In order to generate the experts' score with reference to Table 3 , five semantic values shown in Table 4 are specified to represent different fuzzy numbers. The membership function of the corresponding triangular fuzzy number is shown in Fig. 7 . Table 4 . Semantic values of event occurrence probability and the corresponding triangular fuzzy number • Analysis sequences It is necessary to synthesize the semantic judgments of multiple experts for a more accurate characterization of the event occurrence possibility through fuzzy numbers. This paper adopts the fuzzy number synthesis method using a weighted summation, and using this method, the comprehensive evaluation of an event i can be expressed as (6) The weight value of the j th expert (j = 1, 2,…,n) can be represented by , and represents the semantic evaluation fuzzy number of the j th expert for the i th event, (i = 1,2,…,m).
(1) Deburring In this paper, the mean area method is used to process the fuzzy probability and obtain the exact probability [30] . The formula is shown as follows: (7) (2) Probability normalization For each basic event, the sum of the state probabilities must be equal to one, therefore, the probability given by (4) should be normalized as follows: [31] [32] 
The final probability of the root node obtained after deburring is shown in Table 5 . 
CPT estimation
The conditional probability table for each sub-node can be determined based on the root node probability. The SCC can face multiple uncertainties during its construction due to lack of available data. This section uses both expert interviews and questionnaires to obtain the conditional probability table for the nodes, where the interview questions are mainly based on probability assignment. Based on the given constraints, the interviewed experts will independently give the corresponding probability values, which are then statistically analyzed to obtain an average value.
Taking the sub-node "insufficient vigilance" (A2) as an example, as shown in Figs. 4 and 5 , there are four parent nodes of A2, including "excessive fatigue" (A3), "insufficient sense of responsibility" (A5), "poor physical and mental conditions" (A6) and "over-reliance on automation" (A7), where A2 can have a value of either zero or one. The former value indicates that the operator is not vigilant enough, while the latter value indicates that the operator is vigilant. Similarly, the four parent nodes of A2 also have two states, namely zero and one. The conditional probability table of the sub-node "insufficient vigilance" (A2) with respect to other states is shown in Table 6 . Table 6 . Conditional Probability of "Insufficient Vigilance" (A2) 
Results
Based on the three-stage BNs topology structure of human factors in the SCC, the knowledge of experts is effectively extracted using the calculation method described in the previous sub-section. Subsequently, the conditional probability table of each node is calculated and the probability values are input to the analysis software. The network prediction model for the three stages are shown in Figs. 8-10 and the human error occurrence probabilities P1, P2, P3 in each stage can be obtained using these models. Using these probability values in (4), the occurrence probability of ship accident, also called the total human error probability in emergency situations, is calculated as P=1-0.9961×0.9984×0.9969=8.58e-3. 
Sensitivity analysis
In order to analyse the influence of each human factor on autonomous cargo ship navigation accidents, the sensitivity of the proposed BNs model of the SCC is analysed in this section. First, the occurrence probability of each parent node is assigned the value of one, i.e.,
where i denotes the node category of the risk factor and j denotes the node number of the risk factor. Then, a full probability variation table of risk events in autonomous cargo ships caused by human errors in the SCC is obtained after prediction.
Taking the example of node "excessive fatigue" (A3), the network topology diagram of the perception stage variations when the monitoring staff is excessively fatigued is shown in Fig. 11 . Figure 11 . Schematic diagram of the calculation results of the posterior probability in the perception stage Based on (4) and Fig. 11 , the total occurrence probability of accidents can be calculated as P=8.68e-3 for the case of "excessive fatigue" (A3) in emergency scenario. Similarly, the full occurrence probability of accidents relative to each node variable can be predicted, as shown in Table 6 . Table 6 shows the posterior probability of each node. The sensitivity of human factors affecting the autonomous cargo ship navigation accidents is ranked as follows:
A1> C4> C2> A4> B2> A2> C5> C3> B1 > A7> C1> B3 > B4> A3> A5> A6.
Model validation
This paper could be observed that when the staff on the SCC has to deal with the emergency disposal of autonomous cargo ships in section 4.4. The factors whose posterior probabilities are higher than the prior probability include "negligence when one person monitors multiple ships", "uncoordinated man-machine interaction", "situational awareness defect", "information overload", "lack of experience in emergency disposal", "insufficient vigilance" and "insufficient training", with a combined probability value of greater than 100%. In fact, in the whole system, "negligence when one person monitors multiple ships" and "uncoordinated man-machine interaction" have the two highest node sensitivities, which significantly impact the occurrence of ship accidents. In other words, these two human error factors are highly likely to cause ship accidents due to the failure in personnel emergency disposal.
Although existing studies focused mainly on human factor identification for autonomous cargo ships, they lacked details about different human error types and their importance in the emergency response disposal by the SCC. For example, Ramos explored human factors in the navigation process of autonomous cargo ships. This study mainly used the event tree analysis to analyse which human error may occur in the ship control and its degree of impact on consequent accidents, based on the progressive order of events. In addition, another study [29] figured out that the most important human errors affecting ship navigation include personnel negligence, information overload, situational awareness defect, skill degradation and insufficient vigilance caused by ignorance. The study emphasized the human factors such as monitoring personnel's negligence and situational awareness defect, which is consistent with the human error factor ranking presented in this study.
DISCUSSION
This study utilized THERP and Bayesian theory to predict human error probabilities in emergency disposal when a ship is controlled remotely by the SCC. The findings manifested that the probability of error by the operator in the SCC during the emergency process was 8.58e-3, which is slightly higher than that of traditional ships. It was observed by a study of existing literature that the researchers are not optimistic about the safety of autonomous cargo ships, because although the human safety is guaranteed when the operators are transferred from the ship to the SCC, the risk index for the ship itself is higher than that of traditional ships. Therefore, there is an urgent need for further research on the safety of autonomous cargo ships.
Based on the human factors sensitivity results in case of emergency disposal of autonomous cargo ships, an analysis of eight risk factors having a high sensitivity score was carried out. The analysis revealed that it was necessary to strictly control the "negligence when one person monitors multiple ships" (A1). Similarly, the problem of "information overload" (A4) should also be avoided. To manage "uncoordinated human-system interaction" (C4), "situational awareness defect" (C2) and "lack of ship perception" (C3), it is necessary to have realistic simulations and training, while an emergency plan system should be improved to deal with "lack of experience in emergency disposal" (B2). Finally, crew training should be strengthened to avoid "insufficient vigilance" (A2) and "insufficient training" (C5).
In summary, there are several points that the clients should pay attention to when constructing the SCCs and training the operators. These points include: "standardize the number of ships monitored by one person", continuously "enhance truthfulness of simulated cabins", strengthening "emergency plan improvement and emergency disposal drills" and mitigating "insufficiency of education and training". These points can provide theoretical basis and reference opinions, thereby reducing human errors in emergency disposal of autonomous cargo ships.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper analysed the emergency disposal process in the SCC of autonomous cargo ship with the third degree of autonomy. Based on this analysis, the human error probability was divided into three stages of perception-decision-execution, using the human error probability prediction method. Then, the BNs models of the three stages were constructed, followed by calculations of the basic probability of root node based on processing expert opinions using triangular fuzzy numbers. Subsequently, the conditional probability of each intermediate node in the network was also determined, which was used to obtain the human error probability of the entire emergency treatment process. This probability was equal to 8.58e-3. Finally, the factor importance was ranked based on sensitivity analysis of each human factor. Specifically, the top eight risk factors included "negligence when one person monitors multiple ships" (A1), "uncoordinated human-system interaction" (C4), "situational awareness defect" (C2), "information overload" (A4), "lack of experience in emergency disposal" (B2), "insufficient vigilance" (A2), "insufficient training" (C5) and "lack of ship perception" (C3). Additionally, Risk Control Options were proposed to provide theoretical suggestions and support for the future construction of SCCs, and staff training.
As the concept of SCC is still in the design stage, the human factor error model for the SCC needs further improvement. The predicted human error probability and conclusions in this paper only serve as a reference for designing a SCC, and risk prevention and control. The human error model can be further studied in future when the SCCs become operational.
